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ABSTRACT:  In Greece and other countries of the eurozone there are a number of 
misconceptions about the debt crisis.  I argue against seven of such misconceptions (or, 
myths) about the effects of default, the primary cause of the crisis, the likely effects of an 
exit from the eurozone, the bargaining power of the Greek government in its negotiations 
with the EU/ECB/IMF troika, and others.  Default and exit from the eurozone appears to 
be the most viable alternative in the long run; such a move would seem to require 
considerable preparation under short time constraints and a government with broad 
political support. 
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In reporting and in opinions presented in the mainstream Greek press there are a 
surprising number of misconceptions and myths about the causes, consequences, and 
available policies to combat the crisis.  Some of the misconceptions are consciously 
propagated by the government and mainstream media while they know that they are 
untrue.  Other misconceptions might be apparently believed by government officials, 
those close to them and most of the press.  
 
Many Greeks who are not economists or experts consciously or instinctively understand 
that there is a serious problem with the dominant narrative, but they do not have the 
knowledge to argue in detail against the misconceptions.  Moreover, many of those who 
know better and could argue against the misconceptions either self-censor or have 
difficulties in accessing mainstream media. 
 
A subset of the misconceptions is also prevalent in the global press and propagated by 
European politicians, bankers, and journalists.  My sense is that, curiously, there is less 
debate and fewer challenges to misconceptions within eurozone countries than outside of 
them.  Perhaps this is because outside observers are less constrained in expressing their 
independent assessment of the problems facing the eurozone and Greece. 
 
I argue against the following seven myths: 
 
•  Myth #1: Default or “bankruptcy” would be catastrophic for Greece. 
•  Myth #2: The troika’s objective is to “rescue” Greece.  
•  Myth #3:  The main cause of the crisis is the corruption of Greeks and the Greek 
State 
•  Myth #4:  If only the Greek government were competent, the targets of the 
Memorandum would not fail. 
•  Myth #5: Following the troika’s policies will lead Greece back to prosperity. 
•  Myth #6: Exit from the eurozone would be the worst possible outcome. 
•  Myth #7: In its negotiations with the troika, the Greek government has very little 
bargaining power. 
 
I consider each myth in turn and offer some concluding remarks at the end. 
 
Myth #1: Default or “bankruptcy” would be catastrophic for Greece.  
 
From the beginning of the crisis this myth has probably been the most repeated and very 
insistently so by Mr. Papandreou and other government officials.  In February of 2010, 
when such utterances first appeared, it would have been difficult to imagine that 
government officials would continue to do so unchallenged for so long. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that the agreement of July 21 includes a provision that the 
Greek Finance Minister has already called “selective bankruptcy” whereby existing 
bondholders were supposed to receive a 21 percent “haircut” through lengthening of the 
terms of their bonds and a lower interest rate. Thus the scaremongering about default and 2 
 
“bankruptcy” does not make sense when the Finance Minister himself has already 
admitted that his government has agreed to go through one already.  The October 26 
agreement calls for a higher 50 percent haircut, though these numbers cannot be taken as 
a serious indication of the total debt’s effective reduction.
1 
 
One source of the confusion could be the usage of the term “bankruptcy” which has a bad 
connotation in Greek, especially in connection with personal bankruptcy. It brings to 
mind images of total destitution, perhaps even indentured servitude.  For modern 
capitalism, though, bankruptcy and debt default along with limited liability are key 
features.
2  With limited liability for the borrower it is also the lender’s responsibility, not 
just the borrower’s, that loans would be repaid.  This, in principle, ensures that not too 
many bad loans are made and the financial crisis that began in the US shows what occurs 
when lenders become irresponsible in that system.  Thus, debt default and bankruptcy for 
individuals and corporations are critical attributes in the functioning of modern 
capitalism.  If the lender has not been careful in choosing his borrowers, then it is both 
economically efficient and fair that he loses. 
 
But there are at least three differences between default and bankruptcy, on the one hand, 
by individuals or corporations and, on the other hand, by sovereign states.  First, states do 
not literally go bankrupt, in the sense that there is no higher supranational ultimate 
authority and courts that will decide and enforce how the country’s assets will be 
allocated between the different creditors and what will remain with the country’s state.  
Instead, bonds and loans are issued according to the laws of specific jurisdictions, but 
with the ultimate enforcement can be difficult since states are sovereign.  As can be 
expected though when big interests are involved, posturing, bargaining, and even gunboat 
diplomacy can play a role on what occurs in the event of default.  Legally, the vast 
majority of Greek debt issued before 2010 is governed by Greek law.  In the event of 
default on that debt, Greek courts have final legal authority.  The EU/ECB/IMF troika 
debt has been issued according to English law and defaulting on that debt would be 
considerably more difficult than that issued under Greek law.  If one of the agreements of 
                                                 
1 A 50% haircut would not bring significant reduction of Greek public debt.  There are two issues with the 
gross (over)reporting of the haircuts.  First, they do not apply to troika debt or bonds held by ECB and 
possibly to some other public entities.  Thus, a 50% haircut on this partial debt would be 
something less, say 30%, of total debt. Second, a 50% haircut on the remaining debt is not a 50% reduction 
in principal (which is what it should be if it's a straight write-down).  Instead, it's a combination of making 
the term of the bonds longer (say, doubling from 10 to 20 years) by issuing new bonds at a lower interest 
with perhaps some small reduction in principal.  Then, the "estimated" haircut depends on how you 
discount the future and the higher you discount the future, the more miniscule is the Present Value of 
payments that the bond will pay in the future and therefore the higher the implied or estimated "haircut" 
today.  In the July 21 agreement, for example, they reportedly used a discount rate of 9% to arrive at the 
reported haircut of 21% when more normal discounting (like market interest rates) might have yielded 
something like 10% of private debt.  Therefore, one cannot accurately estimate the real reduction of debt 
unless one knows exactly which part of debt is excluded from the negotiations, the exact conditions of the 
new bonds that are issued in exchange for old bonds and the discount rate assumed in the calculations.   
2 If, as in the old days, the lender could go after all of a borrower’s assets and even enserf him or her so as 
to ensure full repayment, then the lender would have no incentive to provide loans that have a high chance 
of being repaid and would use lending primarily as a form of acquiring the borrower’s assets, including 
possibly his labor. 3 
 
July 21 or October 26 were to be ratified, the bondholders would receive bonds that 
would be governed by English and not Greek law, thus making further “haircuts” more 
difficult. 
 
The second important difference of sovereign debt from other debts is that it is issued and 
controlled by government officials on behalf of the country and its people.  There can be 
a big difference, however, between the interests of government officials and the interests 
of the country and its people.  One extreme case of such a difference in interests is that of 
former President Mobutu of Zaire whose international loans were mostly diverted to 
foreign private bank accounts with the country seeing no benefits and stuck with paying 
back the loans.  But even nominally elected government officials can be parties to loans 
that are illegal or odious and, thus, there might be a legal or moral basis for negating such 
debts.  Given the numerous scandals that have rocked both governing political parties, all 
previously issued Greek debt needs to be scrutinized for possible illegality and 
odiousness.  For example, the contracts with the investment banks that underwrote bond 
issues, and the records of their implementation need to be opened as a matter of basic 
transparency and democratic accountability. 
 
The third difference is that sovereign debt rarely, if ever, involves explicit collateral.   (Of 
course, one recent exception is Finland’s demand for collateral from Greece in order to 
participate in the EFSF mechanism.) Despite this usual absence of collateral, however, it 
is has historically been difficult to completely dispose of foreign public debt.   
 
Given that default is routine even in cases of individual or corporate debt and the fact that 
most of Greece’s debt is governed by Greek law, on balance it would it appear that 
default would not be difficult.  Why, then, wouldn’t the country default on it 
immediately? 
 
One reason might be because the country would not be able to access international capital 
markets again.  Greece, though, does not have access to international markets now and 
will continue to have no access to them by following the current path, precisely because 
of its high level of debt and the implied high likelihood of default.  On the contrary, a 
generous “haircut” would make the remaining debt sustainable and then foreign creditors 
who would be more likely to lend to the country, just as they have done for other 
countries that have defaulted like Russia and Iceland.   How fast Greece could come back 
to international bond markets would depend on the size of the haircut (the higher the 
haircut, the more sustainable debt becomes) but also on how fast the legal tangles with 
bondholders last, with longer outstanding legal issues making return more difficult.  
 
Moreover, there are ways to borrow internationally other than through the bond markets, 
from other sovereign states or from individual financial institutions.  Cyprus, for 
example, recently arranged for a sizable international loan from Russia.  Finally, let us 
also not forget that before Greece entered the eurozone it borrowed very little from 
abroad even though its debt-to-GDP ratio was high, and that ratio was sustainable 
precisely because it was internally held and in its own currency. 
 4 
 
If Greece had defaulted in early 2010 Greek debt could have become sustainable in the 
long run with a writedown imposed on bondholders of considerably below 50% of total 
debt. The country would have had to borrow internally, perhaps issue IOUs (as it has 
done already), and impose a few modest cuts.  The effect of such a policy would have 
been mildly recessionary. 
 
What was done instead by the troika was to provide Greece with loans so as to cover its 
budget deficit without default, in exchange for increasingly draconian budget cuts, tax 
increases, and institutional changes of dubious value.  Existing bondholders continued – 
and continue to this day -- to have their interest and maturing principal fully paid. 
 
The effect of this policy has been a fast downward spiral of the economy. Since debt 
keeps increasing and the country keeps getting poorer fast, debt is becoming ever less 
sustainable.  The debt-to-GDP went from 115% to 160% in less than two years.  As 
reported in the Financial Times of October 22, 2011, a confidential troika analysis of the 
sustainability of Greek debt is extremely grim, with the baseline scenario projecting 
ratios of above 130%.  But, as with other previous baseline scenarios, the assumptions 
include rosy levels of proceeds from privatization; with lower levels of privatization 
proceeds, debt-to-GDP ratios are still projected to be above 150% in 2030. 
 
Despite the extremely grim debt and economic projections, Greek government officials 
have continually argued against “bankruptcy” and default and have acquiesced to a 
“selective” one only after it was offered by European officials.   Moreover, they had 
recently argued against the higher haircuts suggested by European officials and adopted 
in the October 26 summit. 
 
The timidity in defending Greek interests with the troika and Northern European 
politicians is a common denominator of the Greek government’s response to the crisis.  
How could “bankruptcy” be catastrophic when existing debt is unsustainable according to 
all disinterested parties and even according to many interested ones, including the 
German Finance Minister? The question is no longer about whether Greece should 
default, but rather about the size of the default and whether it should be “voluntary,” with 
the consent of the great majority of bondholders or a unilateral one that involves a 
minority of  them. 
 
 
Myth #2: The troika’s objective is to “rescue” Greece. 
 
This is a meme/myth that is found abroad and has been completely internalized by the 
Greek government and, until recently, by almost all mainstream Greek media.  According 
to that narrative, all Greeks have been profligate “sinners” and the troika is a benevolent 
dictator who is not only rescuing them materially now but is also forcing them to 
transform their institutions in ways that will bring them long-term prosperity. 
 
Let us first review who has gained and who has lost from the “rescue” thus far.  Here, the 
two immediate parties with large stakes were on one side the vast majority of Greeks and 5 
 
on the other side the country’s debtholders.  Clearly up to this point the vast majority of 
Greeks have paid dearly whereas the country’s pre-existing bondholders continue to have 
their interest as well as any maturing principal paid in full, although the market value of 
non-maturing bonds has plummeted.
3  
 
  Alternatives to the troika’s “rescue” 
 
Defenders of the government’s response typically say that the alternative would have 
been “bankruptcy” which, of course, according to the myth they propagate (#1) would 
have been catastrophic.  So let us consider the alternative of “bankruptcy” in early 2010.  
The debt-to-GDP ratio was around 115 percent at the time.  If the country had imposed 
the haircut agreed on July 21 (21 percent, but a real one), the debt-to-GDP ratio would 
have come down to a bit over 90 percent, a figure that would make debt barely 
sustainable.  A higher haircut would more likely have been required to make the debt 
sustainable in the long run, but certainly that would have been below the levels 
contemplated by European officials now. 
 
Defenders of the government’s response would then retort that, after a default in early 
2010, Greece (i) would be shut out from the international bond markets and (ii) because it 
did not have a primary budget surplus (the government budget surplus excluding interest 
on debt), the government would have been unable to pay wages, pensions and its other 
bills. 
 
While in the short run international bond markets would not have lent to Greece 
immediately, the bigger the haircut the more easily and faster would Greece have come 
back to these markets.  But these would not have been needed and, in any case, it is 
probably unwise for Greece to go back to them any time soon.  Even if foreign lending 
from sources other than bond markets were not to become available, ordinary Greeks 
would have gladly bought Greek government bonds at 4.5% instead of the 2% or lower 
they had been getting in their bank accounts.
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Furthermore, cuts across the board could have taken place but instead of cuts probably 
more effective would have been part payment in IOUs or bills that could be negotiable, at 
a discount, and play the role of near-money. Such a move would have also enhanced 
liquidity in the private sector and prevented the ongoing depression that the troika’s 
policies have induced.  Again, a condition for all of these to have occurred is a deep 
enough haircut, a dreaded “bankruptcy,” that would have reduced public debt to 
sustainable levels in the eyes of everybody, including Greeks. 
 
                                                 
3 For a more extensive analysis of the expected losses and benefits of all parties, including citizens of other 
eurozone countries, see Skaperdas (2011). 
4 Initially, this domestic purchase of bonds would have come from existing assets, primarily bank deposits. 
To continue this practice for additional years a significant increase in Greece’s savings rate would have to 
take place.  The buying of government bonds would have reduced deposits with Greek banks that would 
have, in turn, induced a combination of deleveraging and financing from the ECB or through the Bank of 
Greece using the ELA (Emergency Liquidity Assistance) mechanism.   The reduction of bank deposits has 
taken place anyway without this early default scenario.    6 
 
What came instead were the troika’s increasingly brutal budget cuts whose effects have 
migrated fast from the public sector and the banks to the private real economy where 
credit has been choked off, especially given the idiosyncratic financing through post-
dated checks and other institutional adaptations of the vital small business sector.  As the 
predictable depression deepens, the demands of ever greater budget cuts, unrealistic 
privatization plans, and wholesale cookie-cutter institutional changes that show no 
concern for the Greek Constitution or Greek laws and have no hope of working are still 
peddled to this day as a “rescue” of Greece. 
 
The real rescue was that of bondholders.  In addition to Greek banks and other domestic 
holders, they include French, British, German and other banks that held Greek debt that 
has now mostly migrated to the ECB. 
 
The welfare of ordinary Greeks does not appear to have figured out at all in the 
calculations of the troika, not even through its negative feedback effects on the realization 
of the troika’s assumed objectives and the threat a default of Greece poses for the 
international financial system.  According to some accounts, there was a strong debate 
within the troika between its IMF representatives and the EU/ECB ones.  The former - 
perhaps having learned some lessons from the dismal experience of other countries under 
IMF programs - were more aware of the macroeconomic consequences of severe budget 
cuts and tax increases and tried to moderate the demands of the latter.  The end effect, 
though, was that the views of the EU/ECB effectively prevailed.  The policies pursued 
were consistent with the short-run interests of banks from the eurozone center and 
perhaps with some other private interests; did not appear to take adequate account of the 
contagion and other risks the policies posed to the eurozone and the rest of the world; and 
certainly ordinary Greeks were not considered except possibly as “sinners” who need to 
be punished. 
 
The myth of the “rescue” of Greece, however, has persisted.   Moreover, it has had 
powerful real, negative effects on the politics and economics of the crisis not just in 
Greece but throughout the eurozone. 
 
First, the framing of a “rescue” has allowed the German and other European elites to 
divert attention away from the “bailout” of the banking sector and bondholders, although 
it certainly has not worked to their satisfaction. 
 
Second, it has fuelled populist rage in Northern Europe against the “lazy” common 
Greeks, precisely those who benefited the least from Greek public debt and who are 
solely expected to pay the costs of the crisis thus far.  It has also diverted attention from 
the causes of wage stagnation in Germany, which, by the way, is an important factor in 
increasing Germany’s current account surpluses and contributed to the imbalances within 
the eurozone. 
 
Finally, by internalizing and propagating the myth of “rescue,” the Greek government has 
helped prevent any genuine debate on alternatives within its own party but also in the 




Myth #3:  The main cause of the crisis is the corruption of Greeks and the Greek State 
 
“The painful adjustment policies now taking place in a number of eurozone countries are 
a direct result of their adoption of the euro.” (Feldstein, 2011, p.5) 
 
Whether Mr. Papandreou said to Mr. Juncker that “Greece is a corrupt country” or not, 
the uttering likely reflects the views of some eurocrats and of substantial parts of the 
Greek elites alike.  Moreover, and again according to their views, that has also been the 
cause of the crisis.  Hence, in their own eyes, the troika’s and the government’s “valiant” 
attempt to root out corruption and reform the whole country from the ground up. 
 
  The public sector and corruption 
 
There have of course been many problems with the Greek state and the way the Greek 
clientelistic political system has been operating.
5  But similar problems with the state 
exist in Italy and elsewhere.  And one can have frustrating experiences with the 
“bureaucracy” in Germany too – by its nature, a big part of the rule of law and democracy 
does require extensive rules and bureaucratic organization that may seem less efficient to 
market exchange (but which are necessary and productive overall).  Nobody, of course, 
likes corruption but there is very little known about how to combat it and it should not be 
confused with the size of the government sector, as the richer the country is the higher 
tends to be its government sector as a percentage of its GDP. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the total number of public workers as a percent of the labor force in 
OECD countries for 2000 and 2008.  General government workers are in blue whereas 
the purple bands include the employees of public corporations (like the railroad and 
electricity companies).  Greece has few general government workers – fewer than any 
European OECD country in the sample -- but more employees in public corporations than 
in general government, as well as a higher percentage of public corporation employees 
than any other country.  Still the total percentage of public employees was considerably 
lower than those of countries like Finland, Slovenia and Estonia and comparable to those 
of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
 
Since in other countries many of the services performed by public corporations in Greece 
are privatized, it is not possible to conclude from this information alone that public 
corporations in Greece employ too many workers compared to other countries.  However, 
other evidence suggests that many public corporations have been repositories of 
clientelistic appointments and excessive salaries and pensions.  That is, the “fat” and 
excess might well be in public corporations. Therefore, a major distinction is warranted 
between public corporations and the public sector proper.  Any anti-corruption measures 
as well as wage and pension cuts should have been primarily targeted in the direction of 
the former. 
                                                 
5 Katsimi and Moutos (2010) provide an overview of Greece’s domestic political economy before and after 
the adoption of the euro. 8 
 
 
The Greek public sector proper might have its serious problems of internal organization 
and accountability to its citizens but this is a typical complaint in all high-income 
countries.  The misinformation and generalized demonization of public employees is 
completely disproportionate and, in the end, self-defeating.  Judges, teachers, tax 
collectors, policemen, firefighters, and a host of other professions are necessary and 
essential for the economy to function.  When you pay judges, policemen, and tax 
collectors a lot less and you do so in a way that may be perceived as unfair and even 
illegitimate, you are unlikely to improve their performance and you are very likely to 
make the problems of the private use of public office even more serious than they were 
before the crisis began. 
 
  Enter the euro 
 
Would Greece have had the experience it has gone through over the past two years (and 
the deteriorating conditions that can be expected in the future) without the euro?  The 
answer is a straightforward “No.”   The euro allowed cheaper financing than was 
previously obtainable by Greek governments and much of it was obtained from abroad 
instead of, as before, exclusively from domestic sources.  This cheaper financing and the 
borrowing from abroad had the subtle effect of making Greek governments less 
responsible than they were before the introduction of the euro.  Arguably, if we are to 
judge from the effective dismantling of the elite tax investigation service (SDOE) and 
other bolder measures in hiring in public corporations, corruption increased and state 
capacity deteriorated since the introduction of the euro. 
 
Of course, the intention of Mr. Simitis and the other architects of Greece’s entry in the 
eurozone was the opposite.  They were hoping that the Greek state would become more 
responsible and constrained in its fiscal choices, although their own act with the Goldman 
Sachs swap that helped reduce earlier reported budget deficits gave the strong flavor of 
what was about to follow.  
 
The introduction of the euro was also hoped to stabilize inflation and reduce the 
uncertainty associated with exchange rate fluctuations.  Instead it brought the disastrous 
results of the current crisis. 
 
If Greece were the sole country to have run into trouble, one could argue that it was 
solely Greece’s problem and not the euro’s.
6  But one country after another has shown 
signs of trouble. There were problems lurking in the background that surfaced with the 
financial crisis and the recession that followed.  Greece’s problem was its fiscal policy 
and external public debt coupled with diminishing international competitiveness.  Ireland, 
judging from its pre-crisis debt-to-GDP ratio, was the most fiscally responsible country 
of the eurozone.   The culprits there turned out to be private over-indebtedness and its 
property bubble that led to problems with its banks, followed by the guarantees its 
government gave to the banks.  Portugal had moderate debt-to-GDP ratios but through 
contagion it was perceived by the bond markets to be the weakest of the rest in terms of 
                                                 
6 The next three paragraphs are partly based on Skaperdas (2011). 9 
 
size, low growth, and fiscal vulnerabilities.  Spain was also nearly as fiscally responsible 
as Ireland and it also suffered from a property bubble and high private debt.  Italy has 
suffered from high public debt and persistently low growth over the past decade. 
 
Greece was the biggest violator of the Stability and Growth Pact’s budget deficit limits 
and had the highest public debt. The Irish and Spanish crises can be considered largely an 
outcome of the unclear supervision of, and gaps in responsibilities for, the banks. 
Portugal has been a victim of the general economic malaise that it has experienced since 
adopting the euro and the power of the bond “vigilantes,” perhaps more so than any of 
the other countries since there was nothing specifically that was done wrong.  But all 
countries experiencing a crisis have had, since the introduction of the euro, a large 
expansion of overall indebtedness, whether primarily public or private, that was 
accompanied by an increase in their current account deficits.  Over the same time period, 
these deficits were matched by an increase in Germany’s current account surplus.
7 
 
For the eurozone, the problem is not Greek government profligacy or Irish carelessness.  
If Ireland or Greece were not part of the eurozone, another peripheral country would get 
into trouble sooner than later.  The problem is structural: the weakness of institutions for 
a monetary union that consists of such diverse and heterogeneous countries that have no 
independent economic tools other than wage and price adjustments that have been 
historically known to be crude instruments.
8  The creators of the euro saw it as primarily 
a political project, as a back-door way of forcing political integration.  Political 
integration, however, never took off the ground and now we have the rather predictable 
results. 
 
To recapitulate, without the euro it is difficult to imagine how a crisis of such depth 
would have occurred.  If Greece had retained its own currency, with less borrowing from 
abroad it would have likely grown less than it did up to 2007 but it would have had the 
tools – a depreciating exchange rate – to weather the recession much better than it did, 
without being on the brink of default or surrendering all semblance of national 
sovereignty.  With borrowing more expensive and domestic in its vast majority, its 
governments would have had better incentives to be more fiscally responsible and would 
have not eroded its tax and other state capacity as much as they did since the introduction 
of the euro.   
 
 
Myth #4:  If only the Greek government were competent, the targets of the Memorandum 
would not fail. 
 
This is the only myth that the Greek government does not propagate itself.  It is instead 
what other domestic and foreign defenders of the Memorandum policies want us to 
believe.  The Memorandum targets, however, could not have worked because the effects 
of the budget cuts were consistently underestimated in the troika’s estimates.  
                                                 
7 See Research on Money and Finance (2010, Fig. 14, 27).   
8 See Ahamed, 2009, for a discussion of the UK’s painful and persistent attempt to return to the Gold 
Standard at pre-World War I exchange rates.   10 
 
 
For example, in March of 2011 the IMF’s estimate for 2011 GDP growth was -3.0% and 
for 2012 the estimate was for a positive 1% growth (see IMF, 2011, Table 8).  As of last 
month, the preliminary figure for year-over-year growth was -7.0% while the estimates 
for 2012 have become negative.  As reported in the Financial Times on October 22, 2011, 
the most recent confidential estimates by the troika are even worse. 
 
Since the economy has been contracting much faster than originally estimated by the 
troika, tax receipts were inevitably lower than estimated and expenditures were higher 
because of increased spending on items like unemployment insurance.  Inevitably, then, 
the budget deficit becomes much bigger than originally estimated, precipitating hectoring 
and calls for additional budget cuts and taxes in order for the government to receive the 
next tranche.  
 
There is no end in sight for this cycle of cuts, new taxes, further contraction of the 
economy, greater budget deficits than originally estimated, with more cuts and taxes 
starting the cycle anew.  
 
The Greek government could be highly competent and the objectives would still fail.  It is 
not highly competent, but it still has implemented a large number of measures that were 
highly unpopular and against stiff opposition.  Examples of such measures include: 
 
•  Increased the VAT to 23%, from 19% or 13% originally, despite all the calls that 
it would reduce competitiveness and possibly reduce VAT receipts. 
•  Eliminated the two “extra” months of pay (Christmas, Easter, and vacation 
bonuses) and replaced them with fractions of the original pay. 
•  Eliminated the raises for seniority in the public sector. 
•  In addition to the above, salaries of public servants were cut by 10% (with 
additional reductions to come). 
•  Similar, in some cases higher, cuts as the above were implemented on pensions. 
•  Equalized the pension requirements for men and women. 
•  Reduced the tax-free income to 5,000 from 12,000 euros. 
•  Reduced medical expenditure tax deductions to 20% (from 40%) even for income 
earned in 2010. 
•  Considerably increased car registration charges from 2010 onwards. 
•  Implemented a new special “solidarity” tax from ranging from 1% to 6% of 
income. 
•  Increased bus ticket prices by 20% and subway ticket prices by 40%. 
•  Reduced severance pay that private employers pay by up to 50% (depending on 
length of notice that is given). 
•  Introduced new house property taxes.  
 
It is difficult to think of any governments anywhere on earth implementing so many 
measures within such a short period of time.  And this is only a sample of the measures 
implemented.   There are also a large number of other measures that either have not been 
implemented or are yet to be voted on by the Parliament. Yet the troika and its defenders 11 
 
keep complaining that the government has “not done enough” or is “dragging its feet” 
and demand more.  
 
One main concern of the critics is the slow pace of liberalizing legal and institutional 
changes by either taking too long to bring bills to parliament or being too slow in 
implementing them once voted into law.  In addition to the substantive objections one 
could bring up against wholesale liberalization, it is surprising that such critics expect 
from a highly unpopular government to just sneak in such reforms expecting no serious 
pushback, especially from a society that disagrees with most of them, even among 
conservative voters. 
 
The economic effects of the troika’s policies were largely predictable and the criticism of 
the government of not being zealous enough in pursuing them reveals, at best, a basic 
unawareness of the limits democratically elected governments have in going against the 
wishes of their electorates.  Still it is difficult to decipher the behavior of the troika and 
how it served the long-term objective of the survival of the eurozone as it now is or 
anything close to it.  It could have been just a combination of bureaucratic inertia, making 
an example of presumed “sinners”, and letting some well-placed interests making a profit 
out of Greece’s predicament. The behavior of blaming the Greek government for all the 
problems, however, appears to have markedly changed recently as it gradually dawned on 
European officials that the problem is indeed systemic and hectoring and threatening the 
Greek Finance Minister will not save the eurozone. 
 
 
Myth #5:  Following the troika’s policies will lead Greece back to prosperity.  
 
In addition to the more immediate budgetary cuts and tax increases, the troika’s policies 
include (i) reductions in wages and prices; (ii) legal and institutional changes aimed at 
liberalizing labor and other factor markets; and (iii) privatization of public property.  I 
will briefly discuss each of the policies, their ostensible objectives, and possible 
implications.  I will then summarize their likely long-term effects. 
 
Effects of reductions in wages and prices 
 
The main objective of reducing wages and prices is for the economy to gain international 
competitiveness.  This is the so-called policy of internal devaluation, as opposed to that 
of external devaluation, whereby a country gains competitiveness through its currency’s 
depreciation which Greece does not have available within the eurozone.  
 
As can already be seen, suppressing wages in such a way is painful, subject to significant 
resistance, and involves the overturning of much existing labor law.  Nevertheless, the 
already substantial reduction in wages has not translated in a reduction in prices; after 
more than eighteen months of austerity, the inflation rate is still 2.5%.   
 
Attempts at internal evaluation are well-known to lead to depression-like conditions with 
high unemployment that lasts for years.  The current experience of Greece within the 12 
 
eurozone is similar to that of the UK after World War I when the pound was brutally 
brought back to its pre-war Gold-standard equivalence.  Yet all the pain, as Keynes had 
warned, was for nothing as the country had to abandon the Gold standard again during 
the Great Depression (see, e.g., Ahamed, 2009).  One major factor that makes internal 
devaluation very difficult is that, as wages and prices decline, the value of debt does not 
adjust.  That makes debt ever more onerous, leading to both higher reductions in 
consumption and defaults which in turn lead to credit contraction and further reductions 
in economic activity and increased unemployment.  Then, the cycle repeats itself with no 
end in sight. 
 
A concrete example might help.  Consider a worker with pre-crisis income of 1000 euros 
a month who had a mortgage of 300 euros a month and other fixed home expenses of 100 
euros a month.  That would have left 600 euros a month for all other expenses.  Now 
consider a 20% percent – 200 euros -- reduction in monthly income.  That would leave 
400 euros a month for all other expenses, which is a 33% reduction in actual consumption 
and other expenses.  That is, the percentage reduction in consumption is likely to be 
higher than the percentage reduction in wages and such reductions can be expected to 
have additional deleterious effects on the economy. 
 
Furthermore, some of the workers like the one in our example will become unemployed 
and they are the ones who are likely to stop paying their mortgages and lose their homes, 
thus inducing a further contraction on credit with additional knock-on effects that can be 
expected on the economy.  This process of debt deflation is an integral part of internal 
devaluations that make them fundamentally different from external devaluations, and in 
the end it seems they never work. 
 
An additional factor that is not usually taken into account in economic analyses but often 
has its own additional negative economic effects is the increased levels of social conflict.  
That factor manifests itself in many different ways:  increased common crime and 
organized crime, strikes, other work stoppages, or passive resistance in other different 
ways.  These activities have direct and indirect effects of reducing production but also 
induce their own dynamic of economic decline.  Already one can identify such effects in 
parts of central Athens as a result of rampant crime. 
 
  Liberalization 
 
The legal and institutional changes imposed by the troika are meant to both facilitate 
internal devaluation through the abolition of many existing labor laws and induce 
structural changes in the economy that will ostensibly contribute to growth.  Examples of 
structural changes that have been pursued include the liberalization of taxis and trucking 
by effectively abolishing licenses for these professions.  Whereas taxi drivers are not the 
best loved profession in Greece and improvements in their level of service would be 
welcome, it is hard to see how the contemplated reforms would lead to significantly 
better levels of service and there is the danger that they would be retrogressive. 
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As for the wholesale changes in labor law, regardless of the opinion one has about their 
effectiveness or justice, there is little popular support for them and none of them were 
part of the program that the current government campaigned on.  Thus, it is difficult to 
reconcile them with a polity that respects the basic democratic rights of its citizens. 
 
What is not pursued, however, is reform of retail and wholesale markets of basic 
consumer goods and services, the structure of which is largely oligopolistic.  The 
persistence of inflation might be related to this problem. 
 
  Privatization 
 
Privatization of public property is hoped to bring in 50 million euros and do so within a 
short few years.  But the question is who is going to buy public enterprises with high debt 
and difficult labor relations or public land restrained by riders that would invite legal 
challenges?  Whatever is sold in the next few years will be of clear title and high value 
but it will be at depressed prices.  Such sales in turn, are likely to bring future legal 
challenges on the part of the directors of the privatization company and others. 
 
  Overall effects 
 
In the end what can we expect by continuing on the path dictated by the troika? 
 
•  Continuing decline of incomes, unemployment, with some reduction of prices of 
domestically produced goods and services.  The decline will likely continue for 
the foreseeable future, especially with the expected demographic decline.  The 
young and anyone who might be able find employment abroad will leave the 
country.  Thus the most productive segments of the society will stop contributing, 
reducing taxes further and putting additional pressure on public finances, 
pensions, and social services. 
 
•  Even with a generous haircut of existing public debt, the continuing reduction in 
the country’s income will make public debt a continuing burden.  To ensure 
compliance, EU and German officials will take over the key posts of the 
country’s fiscal apparatus. 
 
•  Whether a result of the haircuts imposed on public debt or too much bad private 
debt (due to the process of debt deflation outlined above), Greek banks will 
become first nationalized and then sold off to private interests.  Those interests 
are more likely to be foreign, without much connection to the relationships that 
make banks responsive to local needs. 
 
•  Any decision of importance to the Greek people will be taken abroad.  There will 
be little semblance of democracy, self-governance, and national sovereignty, just 
as it has occurred over the past eighteen months.  This, however, would be the 
peaceful scenario that ignores the effects of extended government illegitimacy 
usually brings about:  social chaos but also resistance movements.  14 
 
 
The former East Germany has lost its young and the most productive inhabitants to the 
former West Germany and Berlin.  Those who have remained behind are mostly the old, 
the infirm, and those employed by governments.  Today, more than twenty years after 
German reunification, a lady from East Germany claims that she can distinguish those 
who come from the East from those who come from the West, especially men: “West 
Germans are much prouder. They stand straight. East Germans are more likely to slouch. 
West Germans think East Germans are lazy.” (Lewis, 2011) 
 
By following the current path, the future of Greece is similar to the present of East 
Germany, minus the transfers and subsidies from Berlin, minus the right to vote in 
German elections and all the other benefits of German citizenship, but with the addition 
of a crushing public debt burden. 
 
 
Myth #6: Exit from the eurozone would be the worst possible outcome. 
 
Having your own currency confers several advantages that had become extremely 
underappreciated during the boom years of the eurozone. 
 
First, there is little doubt among economists that the easiest mechanism for a country to 
gain international competitiveness is to have its currency depreciate.  With exit from the 
eurozone, cars and i-phones will become more expensive but food might actually become 
cheaper.  In fact, the introduction of the euro brought distortions in relative prices that 
economists to this day have trouble understanding, and the introduction a new drachma 
might help partially reverse these distortions.  Regardless of that, though, the benefits of 
having your own currency as a way of adjusting to international shocks and international 
competitiveness are well-known and quantitatively important.   
 
Second, having your own currency implies you tailor monetary policy to the country’s 
immediate needs, instead of having it determined by the needs of the most influential 
country in a monetary union which are unlikely to be aligned with your own needs.  This 
is especially important in periods or recession and depression like the one currently 
Greece is in. 
 
Third, the experience of the past eighteen months has amply demonstrated that being in 
the eurozone is incompatible with democracy in Greece and national sovereignty.
9  As 
discussed above (on Myth #5) following the current path holds more of the same.  The 
only possibility of remaining within the eurozone and Greeks having any say is to have 
                                                 
9 As developed by Rodrik (2011) and as applied to the eurozone by O’Rourke (2011), there is a 
fundamental political “trilemma” between democracy, national determination, and economic globalization.  
You cannot have all three of them simultaneously.  By being part of the eurozone (an instance of economic 
globalization), you normally give up some national determination, but in the case of Greece even 
democracy has substantially eroded since all major decisions dictated by the troika are voted against strong 




political unification of all the eurozone countries with full democratic rights for all the 
citizens of its constituent countries.  That would bring some democratic legitimacy in the 
eurozone, although that would be the end of all national sovereignties.  However, not 
even political unification is likely, let alone political unification with democracy 
eurozone-wide. 
 
Democratic legitimacy and national determination are not just abstract concepts that are 
disconnected to people’s everyday lives and their work.  For the merchant it implies the 
government’s policy towards banks and liquidity in general takes their interests into 
account.  For the worker it implies that their concerns for unemployment and inflation 
will have to be heard in Athens instead of (not be heard) in Berlin, Frankfurt, or Brussels.  
The local industrialist will also have a chance to be heard and influence policy. 
 
Thus, economic reasons, democratic legitimacy, national sovereignty, and even basic 
dignity are all related and point to Greece having its own currency.  Most of those who 
object to exit from the eurozone are mainly concerned with the costs of transition.   
Won’t the foreign debt burden increase even more due to devaluation?  How will the 
banks adjust to the change in currencies?  How will the country import essential items 
like petroleum and pharmaceuticals?  What will happen to bank deposits?   Won’t all this 
create total chaos? 
 
Those, and many others, are fair questions to ask.  What is important is how competent, 
honest, and ready to defend Greek interests will be those who manage the transition; how 
fast and flexible will they be in adjusting as unforeseen problems crop up; how able will 
they be in articulating their actions to the Greek people so that negative reactions are 
minimized.  A completely uncontrolled and unplanned exit from the eurozone will be 
chaotic and a lot more painful than a controlled and well-planned one. 
 
Going back to the questions about the transition period, I start with the first one on the 
debt burden:  As noted above, almost all non-troika debt has been issued under Greek law 
and was contracted in the country’s national currency which would have been the euro 
before the transition but, after the transition, all financial assets and debts would become 
denominated in the new currency at the rate prescribed on the first day of transition.  
Legal arguments would be made for and against the denomination of old debts in “new 
drachmas” but the ultimate arbiter of this dispute would be Greek courts.  Since both 
bank deposits and other debts would also become denominated in new drachmas it would 
be difficult to argue that public debt should not.  This denomination of debts would also 
provide an incentive to other countries not to encourage a rapid and undue depreciation of 
the new drachma. 
 
The adjustment of the banking system will take some time with many twists and turns 
that cannot all be predicted in advance, but the problems should be manageable.  As 
former Czech President Vaclav Klaus mentioned, based on the experience of the breakup 
of Czechoslovakia and the currency transition there, exiting the eurozone will not involve 
overwhelming logistical problems. 
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Naturally, capital controls will need to be imposed and other measures will have to be 
taken to ration foreign exchange for the importation of essential items. 
 
Bank deposits will automatically be adjusted to the new currency as will be all domestic 
debts.  Inevitably, net creditors will lose some and net debtors will gain in the short run 
but even net creditors might gain in the long run since the economy can be expected to 
grow faster than if it were to remain within the eurozone. 
 
The transition will be difficult and painful but, if managed properly, the pain will be short 
term.   With its own currency the Bank of Greece and the government will be able to 
inject much needed liquidity in a currently dying domestic market due to an extreme 
shortage of credit and liquidity.  The increased liquidity along with the beneficial effects 
of depreciation through import substitution, reduced imports, and possibly increased 
exports will bring the economy back to life and increase employment.  Of course, the 
government will have to negotiate a narrow path between increased liquidity and keeping 
inflation within reasonable levels. 
 
While many economists located outside the eurozone, including figures like Paul 
Krugman and Martin Feldstein, recognize the benefits or even the necessity of Greece 
exiting the eurozone, most economists within it have studiously avoided even mentioning 
the subject.  Some studies by banks present scenarios that are rather bleak.  UBS (2011), 
for example, claims that Greece’s GDP will be cut in half if it were to leave the eurozone.  
Leaving aside the fact that Greece’s GDP could be in a few years half of what it was in 
2009 by following the path prescribed by the troika, the assumption of the study is that 
any devaluation of the new drachma will be immediately matched by increased tariffs 
from EU countries.  Such a threat of retaliation is also mentioned by others. 
 
The question is who would have an interest in implementing such retaliatory tactics, 
coordinating them EU-wide, and what would that imply for today’s world trading 
system?  To engage in such retaliatory activity, all the EU countries would have to agree, 
when some of them would also be seriously contemplating exit from the eurozone.  Why 
would they want to effectively foreclose such an option to themselves?  Moreover, such a 
retaliatory tariff would have serious implications not just for the future of the EU but for 
today’s globalized world trading system.  It would be the beginning of the end of the 
world as we know it and every country would want to protect itself and its people from 
the coming tsunami. 
 
That would actually be an additional argument for Greece having its own currency, so as 
to maintain maximum flexibility in its economic policies, in a much less globalized and 
possibly poorer world. 
 
It should be finally noted that the eurozone is likely to break up regardless of what 
Greece does.  The real alternatives are political unification and breakup.  Anything in 
between cannot be sustained, either politically or economically.  Since political 
unification is not in the cards, it is largely of question of when and how the breakup will 
occur.  17 
 
 
In any case, it is highly imperative that, regardless who is in charge of the government, 
the Bank of Greece and the Ministry of Finance have teams secretly working on the 
scenario of eurozone exit.  That could make the difference between a chaotic exit and a 
well-planned one.  
 
Finally, a default and exit from the eurozone would not have to be done in an overtly 
adversarial fashion with Germany and other eurozone countries.  Once such a move 
becomes clear or inevitable by circumstances as it might well become, it would be in the 
interest of all parties to make its effects as smooth as possible. There are many economic 
and political constituencies within Germany that would find such a possibility welcome 
and a mutually advantageous move for Greece, Germany, and for the future of a more 
cohesive and sustainable eurozone.  There would be also no reason for Greece to leave 
the EU or for other countries to demand its expulsion.  The apocalyptic scenarios that are 
circulated are sometimes just part of the negotiating tactics used by one side to prevent 
another side from doing what they don’t want them to do but they do not necessarily have 
much basis in fact.   
 
 
Myth #7: In its negotiations with the troika, the Greek government has very little 
bargaining power 
 
“If you owe the bank a hundred thousand dollars, the bank owns you.  If you owe the 
bank a hundred million dollars, you own the bank.”  American proverb 
 
Greece owes enough money to foreign financial institutions so that even if it does not 
“own” them at least it has enough bargaining power to negotiate for better terms in 
paying back the bonds and to moderate the troika’s austerity demands.  Of course, French 
and German banks as well as the ECB have the backing of the French and German states.  
But, then, in addition to bank losses Greece also has the threat of contagion to the bonds 
of other sovereigns as well as the uncertainty that would emerge after a Greek default 
regarding who has obligations on Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).  Both the contagion and 
CDS problems would freeze the Northern hemisphere’s interbank markets.    
 
In addition to having a threat that Greece definitely has with default and exit from the 
eurozone, there are two other important conditions that enhance one’s bargaining position 
and make a threat credible.  First, you have to believe yourself that your interests differ 
from those of your adversary, and your adversary knows this.  If you personally believe 
that you will be “rescued” by the bank’s representatives out of the goodness of their 
hearts, even if you owe the bank a hundred million dollars, you are definitely not going to 
own the bank.  The bank will still own you.  Second, you need to prepare your side for 
the ultimate threat you have so that the other side has the reasonable fear that you can 
carry out the threat. If you don’t bring a lawyer and other experts with you when you 
negotiate with the bank and are not ready to signal a default, you could not expect the 
bank to take you seriously. 
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As reviewed above, Greece could have defaulted at any time during the past two years 
and could have used that as a credible threat in its negotiations with the troika.  But the 
Greek government apparently has fulfilled neither of the two important necessary 
conditions for successful negotiations. 
 
First, it adopted the framing and perhaps the objectives of the troika and even of the 
German tabloid Bild about the country and its people.  Its visible members appeared 
unaware of the difference between the objectives of the banks, of the troika, and the 
people they supposedly have represented over the past two years.  Perhaps they got 
carried away by the rhetoric about “European solidarity” and “we are all in this together.”  
Such proclamations can be useful but cannot be taken seriously in preparing one’s side. 
Without awareness of the different objectives, no further steps can be taken to create a 
strong Greek bargaining position.  Instead of being an independent actor one becomes 
cognitively captured by the other side. 
 
Without awareness of the differing objectives, the bureaucratic apparatus could not be 
directed to produce data and arguments that would favor Greek interests.  If IMF experts 
wanted to apply their cookie-cutter approach used in other countries, the Government 
should have been able to come up with arguments about the harm that particular reforms 
could induce in Greece.  Examples include the harm that some changes in the private 
labor market would bring about and the supposed 50 billion euros that privatization will 
yield.   
 
Preparing for the ultimate threat of default and exit from the eurozone requires the 
formation of teams of experts beyond the limelight and in secrecy.  Such preparation 
necessitates the development of different scenarios, gaming them and testing the 
robustness of different approaches.  Examples of the myriad issues that have to be 
considered include how to effectively introduce capital controls in case of exit from the 
eurozone, to how the bank payment systems need to be converted, to how will liquidity 
be injected into the economy. 
 
Of course, you need to believe yourself that you are willing to carry out the threat if the 
other side is willing to take everything to the brink, and subtly communicate to the other 
side that you have made preparations and you are willing to go to the brink yourself. 
 
There is no evidence or other indirect indications that the key members of the Greek 
government either believed in negotiating or having made any of the necessary 
preparation to enhance their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the troika. 
 
It is then completely unsurprising that the current Finance Minister was laughed off twice 
-- in June and September -- when he tried to “negotiate” with the troika.  How could it 
have been otherwise when he and his government were not willing to use any threats, let 
alone believe in them? 
 
There are opinions expressed that the government needs more technocrats who will 
navigate the country through the continuing difficult times.  Whereas the expert teams 19 
 
referred to above need technocrats, they also need to be led by those believe that the 
interests of Greeks do not coincide with those of the troika and are willing to defend 
them.   
 
Some cautious observers as well as defenders of the Greek government’s timidity raise 
the issue of possible national security threats that foreign governments might make if 
Greece were to take a hard line in bargaining.  
 
Let us note first that very recently countries like Iceland and Hungary have taken very 
hard lines against the UK’s and the Netherlands’ wishes (in the case of Iceland) and 
against the IMF in the case of Hungary.  The UK and the Netherlands even made explicit 
threats if Iceland were not fully to pay back for the losses of the affiliates of Icelandic 
banks in these two countries.  Well, the Icelandic people, contrary to the prescriptions of 
their terrified political class, voted not to fall for the threats but nothing happened to 
Iceland.  On the contrary, Iceland is preparing for entry into the EU, and nothing bad 
happened to Hungary either. 
 
The national security threats against Greece would presumably come from Turkey.  It is 
unclear why Germany or another country would have an interest in expending the huge 
diplomatic and other resources to induce another country -- Turkey – to attack Greece if 
Greece were to default and exit the eurozone. What would it gain from that, especially 
after an event not to its liking has already taken place?  Furthermore, Turkey’s hands are 
full at the moment and it is extremely unclear how it would enhance its own position by 





Knowingly or unknowingly, the Greek government and mainstream press have been 
repeating most of the myths stated and discussed above.   They have used them in order 
to justify the policies they’ve followed thus far and those they plan to vote on and 
implement in the near future.  
 
The myths also facilitate a near complete absence of debate about alternatives to the 
troika’s path.  Members of parliament who vote whatever the troika asks them to vote use 
the fig leaf of a combination of the myths and the absence of any well-considered 
alternatives. 
 
All opposition parties in parliament are also partly responsible for this state of affairs.  
They complain and object to the current policies but they rarely challenge the myths in a 
sustained, organized and intellectually honest fashion.  Moreover, they have not 
presented cogent alternatives that could convince PASOK members of parliament to 




It is unclear why misconceptions about extremely important policy decisions can persist 
in a liberal democracy with reasonably free press.  I cannot fully explain such a 
phenomenon satisfactorily here but a few minor observations might help in beginning to 
understand the problem.   
 
From the beginning of the crisis Greek government officials and most of the press 
subscribed to the misconceptions. Then, anyone who argued against a particular 
misconception was likely to face a number of questions that were partly based on other 
misconceptions, which made the original argument less convincing or more difficult to 
make.  For example, someone who argues that default would not be a bad thing could 
face a series of questions about how we would be ungrateful to our fellow Europeans 
who have been trying to “rescue” us; how the troika has a good plan that will rid the 
country of corruption and lead it back to prosperity; how default leads to exit from the 
eurozone and that, of course, is the worst possible thing that can occur; and so on.  That 
is, the myths that I have argued against work synergistically, complementing one another.  
Believing one of them tends to make one believe the others.  When, then, the dominant 
narrative in the media is to push most of them, it is difficult for any single person or even 
organization to argue effectively against them without developing their own 
comprehensive narrative or counterproposals, and that takes time. 
 
Furthermore, when a government is under severe pressure externally and internally, it 
still has the power of the state apparatus in its control.  That’s also when there is reason to 
wield that power in ways that it wouldn’t wield in normal times.  It can influence the 
mainstream media gatekeepers in subtle and non-subtle ways, who can in turn affect who 
appears and how those who appear are framed on TV and major newspapers. Those who 
do appear in the media and would normally be critical have to think harder than normal 
about what to say and how to say it in ways that will not offend their hosts.  Journalists, 
pundits, and academics can self-sensor or even abstain from expressing views fearing that 
they will become controversial or offend some of their colleagues.   
 
There is evidence, however, probably partly as a result of popular pressure and the sheer 
weight of reality, that most of the myths are loosening their hold in the mainstream 
media. 
 
This is an opportunity, then, for backbench politicians, or those out of favor and 
parliament, academics, any others with influence to stop acquiescing when the myths are 
repeated and need to speak up when they genuinely have a different view.  Time is 
running out. 
 
I conclude with some basic implications for the future of the arguments developed 
against the seven myths: 
 
•  The current path of debt is unsustainable and therefore default is inevitable.  It 
would be surprising if the October 26 tentative agreement for the advertised 50% 
haircut brings a significant reduction in public debt (see footnote 1 for the 
reasons).  Moreover, just as it occurred with the July 21 agreement, it is unlikely 21 
 
that the vast majority of bondholders will agree in the end.  Whether they will 
agree or not, the effect on Greek public debt and its sustainability will be small.  
Therefore, the country will need a much greater reduction in debt and that is 
unlikely to be accepted “voluntarily” by the bondholders. 
 
•  Following the current path will involve continuing austerity for the foreseeable 
future without being able to see any “light at the end of the tunnel.”  All important 
fiscal decisions will be made outside the country.  The young and skilled who can 
find jobs abroad will emigrate, leaving behind an older, less productive, and 
needier shrinking population that would have to endure a crushing debt burden.   
 
•  Involuntary default under Greek initiative is, then, the most realistic alternative to 
the “voluntary” but ineffective defaults periodically agreed upon in eurozone 
summits.  Such a default will be free of the phantom percentage haircuts that 
appear to be mostly Public Relations initiatives by a Eurozone leadership that 
cannot offer anything else.   It will allow the immediate cessation of interest 
payments and thus avoid some budget cuts and reduce the continued slide in 
income.  It will also make Greece an active, central participant in negotiations for 
its debt instead of default being a matter of private discussion between the 
German Chancellor and the French President. 
 
•  Such default would be a very difficult to sustain within the Eurozone as Greece 
would have to depend on continued funding from the ECB to support Greek 
banks and pension funds.  This and other factors would severely curtail the 
bargaining power of Greece to reduce its debt, thus possibly negating the benefits 
of involuntary default.  Having its own currency, instead, will allow the country to 
better support its banks and funds, as well as having the other advantages I have 
discussed. 
 
•  Default under Greece’s initiative and exit from the eurozone would require quick 
and extensive planning for their effective implementation and the confidence on 
the part of government that this is the right policy to pursue for the country.  The 
current government could not pursue such a policy since its members clearly do 
not have that kind of belief or orientation.  A coalition government that has broad 
support and could include political figures from the right to the left as well as 
some personalities of wide acceptance could best be suited to thread through the 
difficult path that would lie ahead.  Such a government could mobilize the 
population to accept the sacrifices that will be necessary in the short run and 
medium run since it would offer an alternative on which the government and its 
people at least would have a say about the outcome.  As a bonus, it could even 
achieve the fundamental changes in governance that almost everybody has been 
calling for in Greece but which the existing, currently disintegrating, political 
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Figure 1:  Employment in general government and public corporations as a percentage of 
the labour force (2000 and 2008). Red bars represent employment in public corporations. 
This is Figure 21.2 in OECD (2011). 
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), LABORSTA database. Data for Turkey are from the Ministry of Finance 
and the Turkish Statistical Institute. Data for Japan for employment are from the Establishment and Enterprise Census. 
Data for Korea were provided by government officials. 
Japan: Employment is not classified according to SNA definition and are substituted by direct employment by central or 
sub-central governments. 
Data for Iceland are missing. 
Data for 2000 for Korea are missing and this country is not included in the average (OECD32). 
Data for Australia, Chile and United States refer to the public sector (general government and public corporations) 
Data for Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherlands New Zealand and Poland are expressed in full-time equivalents 
(FTEs). In New Zealand FTEs are included for education, health and community services and personal and other 
services. 
Finland, Israel, Mexico, Poland and Sweden: 2007 instead of 2008. 
France, Japan, New Zealand and Portugal: 2006 instead of 2008. 
Russian Federation; 2005 instead of 2008; Brazil and South Africa 2003 instead of 2008.  
 